A concept of randomness for infinite time register machines (ITRMs) is defined and studied. In particular, we show that for this notion of randomness, computability from mutually random reals implies computability and that an analogue of van Lambalgen's theorem holds. This is then applied to obtain results on the structure of ITRMdegrees. Finally, we consider autoreducibility for ITRMs and show that randomness implies non-autoreducibility. This is an expanded and amended version of [4] .
Introduction
Martin-Löf-randomness (ML-randomness, see e.g. [6] ) provides an intuitive and conceptually stable clarification of the informal notion of a random sequence over a finite alphabet. The guiding idea of ML-randomness is that a sequence of 0 and 1 is random if and only if it has no special properties, where a special property should be a small (e.g. measure 0) set of reals that is in some way accessible to a Turing machine.
Since its introduction, several variants of this general approach to defining randomness have been considered; a recent example is the work of Hjorth and Nies on Π 1 1 -randomness and a Π 1 1 version of ML-randomness, which led to interesting connections with descriptive set theory ( [8] ).
We are interested in obtaining a similar notion based on machine models of transfinite computations. In this paper, we will exemplarily consider infinite time register machines. Infinite Time Register Machines (ITRMs), introduced in [9] and further studied in [10] , work similar to the classical unlimited register machines (URMs) described in [5] . In particular, they use finitely many registers each of which can store a single natural number. The difference is that ITRMs use transfinite ordinal running time: The state of an ITRM at a successor ordinal is obtained as for URMs. At limit times, the program line is the inferior limit of the earlier program lines and there is a similar limit rule for the register contents. If the inferior limit of the earlier register contents is infinite, the register is reset to 0.
Classical Turing machines, due to the finiteness of their running time, have the handicap that the only decidable null set of reals is the empty set: If a real x is accepted by a classical Turing machine M within n steps, then M will also accept every y agreeing with x on the first n bits. In the definition of ML-randomness, this difficulty is overcome by merely demanding the set X in question to be effectively approximated by a recursively enumerable sequence of sets of intervals with controlled convergence behaviour. For models of transfinite computations, this trick is unnecessary: The decidable sets of reals form a rich class (including all ML-tests and, by [9] , all Π 1 1 -sets). This is still a plausible notion of randomness, since elements of an ITRM-decidable meager set can still be reasonably said to have a special property. In fact, some quite natural properties like coding a well-ordering can be treated very conveniently with our approach. Hence, we define: Definition 1. X ⊆ P(ω) is called ITRM-decidable if and only if there is an ITRM-program P such that P x ↓= 1 if and only if x ∈ X and P x ↓= 0, otherwise. In this case we say that P decides X. P is called deciding if and only if there is some X such that P decides X. We say that X is decided by P in the oracle y if and only if X = {x | P x⊕y ↓= 1} and P(ω) − X = {x | P x⊕y ↓= 0}. In this case, we also say that P y decides X. The other notions relativize in the obvious way.
Definition 2.
Recall that a set X ⊆ P(ω) is meager if and only if it is a countable union of nowhere dense sets. X ⊆ P(ω) is an ITRM-test if and only if X is ITRM-decidable and meager. x ⊆ ω is ITRM-c-random (where c stands for 'category') if and only if there is no ITRM-test X such that x ∈ X. x ⊆ ω is ITRM-random if and only if there is no ITRM-decidable set X ∋ x of Lebesgue measure 0. If there is no such set decidable in the oracle y ⊆ ω, then x is called ITRM-c-random/ITRM-random relative to y.
Remark: Expect for the section on autoreducibility, we will mostly be concerned with ITRM-c-randomness. This obviously deviates from other definitions of randomness in that we use meager sets rather than null sets as our underlying notion of 'small'. The reason is simply that this variant turned out to be much more convenient to handle for technical reasons. The use of category rather than measure gives this definition a closer resemblance to what is, in the classical setting, refered to as genericity (see e.g. section 2.24 of [6] ). We still decided to use the term 'ITRM-c-randomness' to avoid confusion with the frequently used concept of Cohen genericity, hence reserving the term 'ITRM-random' for reals that do not lie in any ITRM-decidable null set. We are pursuing the notion of ITRM-randomness in ongoing work. In contrast to strong Π 1 1 -randomness ( [8] , [17] ), it will be shown below that there is no universal ITRM-test.
We will now summarize some key notions and results on ITRMs that will be used in the paper.
Definition 3. For P a program, x, y ∈ P(ω), P
x ↓= y means that the program P , when run with oracle x, halts on every input i ∈ ω and outputs 1 if and only if i ∈ y and 0, otherwise. x ⊆ ω is ITRM-computable in the oracle y ⊆ ω if and only if there is an ITRM-program P such that P y ↓= x, in which case we occasionally write x ≤ ITRM y. If y can be taken to be ∅, x is ITRM-computable. We denote the set of ITRM-computable reals by COMP.
Remark:
We occasionally drop the ITRM-prefix as notions like 'computable' always refer to ITRMs in this paper. Proof. This is a straightforward relativization of Theorem 5 of [15] , due to P. Koepke.
Theorem 5. Let P n denote the set of ITRM-programs using at most n registers, and let (P i,n |i ∈ ω) enumerate P n in some natural way. Then the bounded halting problem H x n := {i ∈ ω|P x i,n ↓} is computable uniformly in the oracle x by an ITRM-program (using more than n registers).
Furthermore, if P ∈ P n and P x ↓, then P x halts in less than ω CK,x n+1 many steps. Consequently, if P is a halting ITRM-program, then P x stops in less than ω CK,x ω many steps.
Proof. The corresponding results from [9] (Theorem 4) and [15] (Theorem 9) easily relativize.
We furthermore define the first ω many iterations of the ITRM-jump of x by
We will freely use the following standard propositions:
Then X is meager/comeager/non-meager if and only ifX is meager/comeager/nonmeager.
Most of our notation is standard. By a real, we mean an element of ω 2. L α [x] denotes the αth level of Gödel's constructible hierarchy relativized to x. For a, b ⊆ ω, a ⊕ b denotes {p(i, j) | i ∈ a ∧ j ∈ b}, where p : ω × ω → ω is Cantor's pairing function. During the paper, we will frequently code countable ∈-structures by reals. The idea here is the following: Let X be transitive and countable, and let f : ω ↔ X be a bijection. Then (X, ∈) is coded by the real r X,f := {p(i, j)|i ∈ ω ∧ j ∈ ω ∧ f (i) ∈ f (j)} ⊆ ω, and it is easy to re-obtain (X, ∈) from r X,f . In general, a real x is a code for the transitive ∈-structure (X, ∈) if and only if there is a bijection f : ω → X such that x = r X,f . If (X, ∈) is constructible and X is transitive and countable in L, then L contains a < L -minimal code for (X, ∈); this code will be called the canonical code for (X, ∈) and denoted by cc(X).
Computability from random oracles
In this section, we consider the question which reals can be computed by an ITRM with an ITRM-c-random oracle. We start by recalling the following theorem from [3] . The intuition behind it is that, given a certain non-ITRMcomputable real x, one has no chance of computing x from some randomly chosen real y.
Theorem 9. Let x be a real, Y be a set of reals such that x is ITRMcomputable from every y ∈ Y . Then, if Y has positive Lebesgue measure or is Borel and non-meager, x is ITRM-computable.
Proof. Lemma 46 of [3] shows that ω
for all i ∈ ω whenever x is Cohen-generic over L ω CK ω (see e.g. [3] or [16] ) and that the set of Cohengenerics over L ω CK ω is comeager. Hence {x|ω
and P
x computes a code for ω CK,x i is decidable using the techniques developed in [1] and [2] . (The idea is to uniformly in the oracle x compute a real c coding L ω
CK,x i+1
[x] in which the natural numbers m and n coding ω can be identified in the oracle x, and then to check -using a halting problem solver for P , see Theorem 5 -whether P x computes a well-ordering of the same order type as the element of L ω
[x] coded by n and finally whether the element coded by m is an element of that coded by n.) Hence, if x is ITRM-c-random, then there can be no ITRM-program P computing such a code in the oracle x. But a code for ω CK,x i is ITRM-computable in the oracle x for every real x and every i ∈ ω. Hence, we must have ω
for every i ∈ ω, as desired.
A notable conceptual difference between ITRM-c-randomness and MartinLöf-randomness is the absence of a universal test for the former:
Theorem 11. There is no universal test for ITRM-c-randomness, i.e. the union of all ITRM-decidable meager sets is not ITRM-decidable.
Proof. Assume otherwise. Let U be the union of all ITRM-decidable meager sets and let P be an ITRM-program such that P decides U. Clearly, U, as a countable union of meager sets, is meager. Let P have n registers. Let M be the set of reals x that are Cohen-generic over
As the set of reals which are Cohen-generic over L ω CK n+2 is comeager, M is a subset of a meager set and hence meager. It is also easy to see that M is ITRM-decidable: To decide M, compute a code for L ω CK
n+2
; then, given a real y in the oracle, search through the dense subsets of Cohen-forcing in L ω CK n+2 to see whether x intersects all those contained in L ω CK
n+1
, but fails to intersect at least one dense subset contained in L ω CK n+2 . Now pick x ∈ M. As x ∈ M and M is ITRM-decidable and meager, we have x ∈ U, so P x ↓= 1. By genericity of x over L ω CK n+1 and the forcing theorem, there is a condition p of Cohen-forcing such that p ⊆ x and p P x ↓= 1. Consequently, we have p P y ↓= 1 for every L ω CK
-generic real y extending p. By absoluteness of computations, it follows that P y ↓= 1 for each such y. Since P decides U, each such y hence belongs to U. But the set of these y is comeager in some interval and hence not meager. Hence U has a non-meager subset and his thus not meager, a contradiction.
Then a ≤ ITRM z if and only if a is ITRM-computable. Consequently (as the set
[a] and a ≤ ITRM z. By the forcing theorem for provident sets (see e.g. Lemma 32 of [3] ), there is an ITRM-program P and a forcing condition p such that p PĠ ↓=ǎ, whereĠ is the canonical name for the generic filter andǎ is the canonical name of a. Now, let y and z be mutually Cohen-generic over L ω CK,a ω +1 [a] both extending p. Again by the forcing theorem and by absoluteness of computations, we must have
whenever x and y are mutually Cohen-generic over L α and α is provident (see [16] ). Consequently, we have:
The comeagerness of C a is standard (see e.g. Lemma 29 of [3] ). To see that S a is meager for non-ITRM-computable a, observe that the Cohengeneric reals over L ω CK,a ω
+1
[a] form a comeager set of reals to none of which a is reducible.
Definition 13. Let x, y ⊆ ω. If x is ITRM-c-random relative to y and y is ITRM-c-random relative to x, we say that x and y are mutually ITRM-crandom.
Intuitively, we should expect that mutually random reals have no nontrivial information in common. This is expressed by the following theorem: Theorem 14. If z is ITRM-computable from two mutually ITRM-c-random reals x and y, then z is ITRM-computable.
Proof. Assume otherwise, and suppose that z, x and y constitute a counterexample. By assumption, z is computable from x. Also, by Theorem 5, let P be a program such that P a (i) ↓ for every a ⊆ ω, i ∈ ω and such that P computes z in the oracle y. In the oracle z, the set A z := {a|∀i ∈ ωP a (i) ↓= z(i)} is decidable by simply computing P a (i) for all i ∈ ω and comparing the result to the ith bit of z. Clearly, we have A z ⊆ {a | z ≤ ITRM a}. Hence, by our Lemma 12 above, A z is meager as z is not ITRM-computable by assumption. Since A z is decidable in the oracle z and z is computable from x, A z is also decidable in the oracle x. Now, x and y are mutually ITRM-c-random, so that y / ∈ A z . But P computes z in the oracle y, so y ∈ A z by definition, a contradiction.
While, naturally, there are non-computable reals that are reducible to a c-random real x (such as x itself), intuitively, it should not be possible to compute a non-computable real that is 'unique' is some effective sense from a random real. We approximate this intuition by taking 'unique' to mean 'ITRM-recognizable' (see [10] , [1] or [2] for more information on ITRMrecognizability). It turns out that, in accordance with this intuition, recognizables that are ITRM-computable from ITRM-c-random reals are already ITRM-computable. Definition 15. x ⊆ ω is ITRM-recognizable if and only if {x} is ITRMdecidable. RECOG denotes the set of recognizable reals.
Theorem 16. Let x ∈ RECOG and let y be ITRM-c-random such that x ≤ ITRM y. Then x is ITRM-computable.
Proof. Let x ∈ RECOG\COMP be computable from y, say by program P , and let Q be a program that recognizes x. The set S := {z | P z ↓= x} is meager as in the proof of Theorem 14. But S is decidable: Given a real z, use a halting-problem solver for P (which exists uniformly in the oracle by Theorem 5) to test whether P z (i) ↓ for all i ∈ ω; if not, then z / ∈ S. Otherwise, use Q to check whether the real computed by P z is equal to x. If not, then z / ∈ S, otherwise z ∈ S. As P y computes x, it follows that y ∈ S, so that y is an element of an ITRM-decidable meager set. Hence y is not ITRM-c-random, a contradiction.
Remark: Let (P i |i ∈ ω) be a natural enumeration of the ITRM-programs. Together with the fact that the halting number h = {i ∈ ω | P i ↓} for ITRMs is recognizable (see [2] ), this implies in particular that the halting problem for ITRMs is not ITRM-reducible to an ITRM-c-random real. In particular, the Kucera-Gacs theorem, which says that every real is reducible to a random real (see e.g. Theorem 8.3.2 of [6]), does not hold in our setting.
An analogue to van Lambalgen's theorem
A crucial result of classical algorithmic randomness is van Lambalgen's theorem, which states that for reals a and b, a ⊕ b is ML-random if and only if a is ML-random and b is ML-random relative to a. In this section, we demonstrate an analogous result for ITRM-c-randomness. This will be a crucial ingredient in our considerations on ITRM-degrees below.
Lemma 17. Let Q be a deciding ITRM-program using n registers and a ⊆ ω. Then {y|Q y⊕a ↓= 1} is meager if and only if
Proof. By absoluteness of computations and the bound on ITRM-halting times (see Theorem 5),
[a]. As this is expressible by a Σ 1 -formula, it must be forced by some condition p by the forcing theorem over KP (see e.g. Theorem 10.10 of [16] ).
Hence every Cohen-generic y extending p will satisfy Q y⊕a ↓= 0. The set
, then this holds for all elements of C and the complement {y|Q y⊕a ↓= 1} is therefore meager. If, on the other hand, Q x⊕a ↓= 1 for some such x, then this already holds for all x in some non-meager (in fact comeager in some interval) set C ′ by the same reasoning.
Corollary 18. For a deciding ITRM-program Q using n registers, there exists an ITRM-program P such that, for all x, y ∈ P(ω), P
x ↓= 1 if and only if {y|Q x⊕y ↓= 1} is non-meager and P x ↓= 0, otherwise.
Proof. From x, compute, using sufficiently many extra registers, the
in the oracle x. This can be done uniformly in x. Then, using c, one can use the recursive algorithm developed in in section 6 of [9] to evaluate statements in L ω
Hence, we can search through c, identify all elements which code reals y ∈ L ω
n+1 +1 and run Q x⊕y for each of them to see whether Q x⊕y ↓= 1; if yes, then we return 1, otherwise, we return 0. [y] of Cohen-forcing. Clearly, for every such D, G D := {y | y ∩ D = ∅} is comeager and ITRMdecidable in the oracle y (and so its complement is ITRM-decidable in y and meager), so every real number that is ITRM-c-random real relative to y must be contained in every G D and hence also in S.
On the other hand, if x ∈ S and P x⊕y ↓= 1 for some ITRM-program P that is deciding in the oracle y, then there is some finite p ⊆ x such that P z⊕y ↓= 1 for every p ⊂ z ∈ S, so the set decided by P in y is not meager. Hence x is not an element of any meager set ITRM-decidable in the oracle y, so x is ITRM-c-random relative to y.
We now give an ITRM-analogue of van Lambalgen's theorem and prove it following the strategy used in the classical setting, see e.g. [6] , Theorem 6.9.1 and 6.9.2.
Theorem 20. Assume that a and b are reals such that a ⊕ b is not ITRM-crandom. Then a is not ITRM-c-random or b is not ITRM-c-random relative to a.
Proof. As a ⊕ b is not ITRM-c-random, let X be an ITRM-decidable meager set of reals such that a ⊕ b ∈ X. Suppose that P is a program deciding X.
Let Y := {x|{y | x ⊕ y ∈ X} non-meager}. By Corollary 18, Y is ITRMdecidable.
We claim that Y is meager. First, Y is provably ∆ 1 2 and hence has the Baire property (see e.g. Exercise 14.4 of [12] ). Hence, by the KuratowskiUlam-theorem (see e.g. [13] , Exercise 5A.9), Y is meager. Consequently, if a ∈ Y , then a is not ITRM-c-random. Now suppose that a / ∈ Y . This means that {y | a ⊕ y ∈ X} is meager. But S := {y | a ⊕ y ∈ X} is easily seen to be ITRM-decidable in the oracle a and b ∈ S. Hence b is not ITRM-c-random relative to a.
Theorem 21. Assume that a and b are reals such that a ⊕ b is ITRM-crandom. Then a is ITRM-c-random and b is ITRM-c-random relative to a.
Proof. Assume first that a is not ITRM-c-random, and let X be an ITRMdecidable meager set with a ∈ X. Then X ⊕ [0, 1] is also meager and ITRMdecidable. As a ∈ X, we have a⊕b ∈ X⊕[0, 1], so a⊕b is not ITRM-c-random, a contradiction. Now suppose that b is not ITRM-c-random relative to a, and let X be a meager set of reals such that b ∈ X and X is ITRM-decidable in the oracle a. Let Q be an ITRM-program such that Q a decides X. Our goal is to define a deciding programQ such thatQ a still decides X, but also {x|Q x ↓= 1} is meager. This suffices, as thenQ a⊕b ↓= 1 and {x|Q x ↓= 1} is ITRM-decidable, so that a ⊕ b cannot be ITRM-c-random.Q operates as follows: Given x = y ⊕ z, check whether {w | Q y⊕w ↓= 1} is meager, using Corollary 18. If that is the case, carry out the computation of Q x and return the result. Otherwise, return 0. This guarantees (since X is meager) that {z |Q y⊕z ↓= 1} is meager and furthermore thatQ a⊕z ↓= 1 if and only if Q a⊕z ↓= 1 if and only if z ∈ X for all reals z, so that {z|Q a⊕z ↓= 1} is just X, as desired.
Combining Theorem 20 and 21 gives us the desired conclusion:
Theorem 22. Given reals x and y, x ⊕ y is ITRM-c-random if and only if x is ITRM-c-random and y is ITRM-c-random relative to x. In particular, if x and y are ITRM-c-random, then x is ITRM-c-random relative to y if and only if y is ITRM-c-random relative to x. We note that a classical corollary to van Lambalgen's theorem continues to hold in our setting:
Corollary 23. Let x, y be ITRM-c-random. Then x is ITRM-c-random relative to y if and only if y is ITRM-c-random relative to x.
Proof. Assume that y is ITRM-c-random relative to x. By assumption, x is ITRM-c-random. By Theorem 22, x ⊕ y is ITRM-c-random. Trivially, y ⊕ x is also ITRM-c-random. Again by Theorem 22, x is ITRM-c-random relative to y. By symmetry, the corollary holds.
Based on Theorem 16, one might conjecture that a real x which is ITRMcomputable from an ITRM-c-random real y must be computable or itself ITRM-c-random. This, however does not hold:
Theorem 24. For every ITRM-c-random real y, there is a real x such that x is neither ITRM-c-random nor ITRM-computable and x is ITRMcomputable from y. However, if x is ITRM-computable from an ITRM-crandom real y and x is an element of an ITRM-decidable set S such that card(S) = ℵ 0 , then x is computable.
Proof. Let x := 0 ⊕ y, then x is clearly computable from y. However, x is not computable as the non-computable y is computable from x. Furthermore, x is contained in the ITRM-decidable meager set {0} ⊕ [0, 1], so x cannot be ITRM-c-random.
For the second statement, assume for a contradiction that S is an ITRMdecidable countable set containing a non-computable real x such that x ≤ ITRM y for some ITRM-c-random real y. Let P be a program deciding S and let Q be a program such that Q y ↓= x. By Theorem 5, we may assume without loss of generality that Q z computes some real for every z ⊆ ω. ByS, we denote the set of z ∈ S such that M a := {a|Q a ↓= z} is meager, Q(z) denotes the real number computed by Q z . Then, as x is not ITRM-computable, we have x ∈S by Theorem 9. FurthermoreS is decidable: For let R be a program such that R a⊕b ↓= 1 if and only if Q a ↓= b and R a⊕b ↓= 0 otherwise; so R is deciding. Now a ∈S if and only if a ∈ S and {b|R a⊕b } is meager, hence, by Theorem 18,S is decidable by some programP . Let M := {z|P Q(z) ↓= 1} be the set of all reals z such that Q(z) ∈S. Then M is obviously ITRMdecidable. As Q(y) = x ∈S, we have y ∈ M. As y is ITRM-c-random, it follows that M is not meager. But M = a∈S M a ; as S is countable, there must thus be some a ∈ S such that M a is not meager, a contradiction.
Note that the condition of being ITRM-computable from an ITRM-crandom real is necessary in the assumption of Theorem 24: It is not true that every element of a countable ITRM-decidable set is ITRM-computable; in fact, there are countable ITRM-decidable sets that do not contain any ITRM-computable element:
To see that X is ITRM-decidable, we apply the techniques from section 6 of [10] to check, for a given oracle x, whether x codes an L-level L α and whether this L α contains exactly one limit of admissible ordinals. It is also shown in [10] how to uniformly compute a code c for L α+1 from x when x codes L α . Hence, it only remains to check whether L α+1 \ L α contains x and whether x is < L -minimal in L α+1 with these properties, and the answers to both questions can be easily read off from c.
Remark:
We do not know whether a countable ITRM-decidable set X can contain a non-ITRM-recognizable element. Our conjecture is that this is not possible and that in fact any ITRM-decidable set with a non-ITRMrecognizable element must have a perfect subset (and hence have cardinality 2 ℵ 0 ). The next result, however, shows that every non-empty ITRM-decidable set (countable or not) contains some recognizable element. This can be seen as a kind of basis theorem for ITRMs:
Theorem 26. Every non-empty ITRM-decidable set of real numbers has a recognizable element.
Proof. Let X = ∅ be ITRM-decidable, and let P be a program that decides X. Let Γ := {ω CK,x ω : x ∈ X}. Since X is non-empty, so is Γ; let µ be the minimal element of Γ and pick x γ ∈ X such that ω CK,xγ ω = µ. By Theorem 5, we thus have P xγ ↓= 1 in less than µ many steps. By absoluteness of computations, it follows that
x ↓= 1. By the Jensen-Karp theorem (see [11] ), the
We claim thatx is recognizable. To see this, first note thatx ∈ L ω CK,x ω , so that there is k ∈ ω withx ∈ L ω CK,x k . Suppose that P uses n registers and
Some consequences for the structure of ITRM-degrees
In the new setting, we can also draw some standard consequences of van Lambalgen's theorem. Proof. By Theorem 22, a 0 and a 1 are mutually ITRM-c-random. If a 0 was ITRM-computable from a 1 , then {a 0 } would be decidable in the oracle a 1 , meager and contain a 0 , so a 0 would not be ITRM-c-random relative to a 1 , a contradiction. By symmetry, the claim follows. 
[h] and is hence ITRM-computable from h.
will contains a real x which is Cohen-generic over L ω CK ω +1 . Such an x can easily be computed from a code for L ω CK+2 ω and consequently, x itself is ITRM-computable from h. By Corollary 19, x is ITRM-c-random.
We have an analogue to the Kleene-Post-theorem on Turing degrees between 0 and 0 ′ (see e.g. Theorem VI.1.2 of [20] ) for ITRMs.
Corollary 30. With h as in Lemma 29, there are x 0 , x 1 such that we have
Proof. Pick x as in Lemma 29, let x = x 0 ⊕ x 1 , and use Corollary 28.
Using van Lambalgen, we can show much more:
Theorem 31. Let T denote the tree of finite 0-1-sequences, ordered by reverse inclusion. Then T embeds in the ITRM-degrees between 0 and 0 ′ , i.e. there is an injection f : T → P(ω) such that, for all x, y ∈ T, we have Proof. We shall, for each s ∈ <ω 2, define a real r s in such a way that the set {[r s ] ITRM |s ∈ <ω 2} has the desired property. Let r = r () be ITRM-c-random such that 0 < ITRM r < ITRM 0 ′ ITRM . Assuming that r s is already defined, let r s = x 0 ⊕ x 1 and set r s0 = x 0 , r s1 = x 1 . Clearly, if s is a proper initial segment of t, then r s < ITRM r t . We show that furthermore, when s and t are incompatible (i.e. none is an initial segment of the other), then r s ⊥ ITRM r t : Let u = r s ∩ r t be the longest common initial segment of r s and r t . Without loss of generality, assume that s starts with u0 and that t starts with u1. Then r u = r u0 ⊕ r u1 , so, by Theorem 22, u0 and u1 are mutually random. Now suppose that r s and r t are not mutually random, e.g. that r s was not random relative to r t . Then, as r t is recursive in r u1 , r s is not random relative to r u1 . Let U be a meager set containing r s which is ITRM-decidable in the oracle r u1 .
Let s ′ be a binary string such that u0s ′ = s and let l denote its length. We recursively define a sequence (U i : 0 ≤ i ≤ l) of subsets of [0, 1] as follows: Let U 0 = 0 and for ≤ i < n let U i+1 := U i ⊕ [0, 1] when the l − ith digit of l is 0 and otherwise U i+1 := [0, 1] ⊕ U i . By an easy induction, we have that r u0(s ′ |i) ∈ U l−i for 0 ≤ i ≤ l, where s ′ |i denotes the restriction of s ′ to its first i many bits. In particular, we have r u0 ∈ U l . Moreover, when X is meager, then so are X ⊕ [0, 1] and [0, 1] ⊕ X, so as U 0 = U is meager, it follows by another induction that U i is meager for 0 ≤ i ≤ l and in particular that U l is meager. It is also easy to see inductively that, as U 0 = U is ITRMdecidable in the oracle r u1 , so is U i for all 0 ≤ i ≤ l and hence in particular for i = l. So U l is meager, contains r u0 and is ITRM-decidable in the oracle r u1 , contradicting the fact that r u0 is ITRM-c-random relative to r u1 .
Corollary 32. The ITRM-degrees of ITRM-c-random reals contain no minimal or maximal element under ITRM-reduction.
Proof. Let y is ITRM-c-random, y = y 1 ⊕ y 2 .
Then first, by Theorem 22, y 1 is ITRM-c-random and y 1 < ITRM y. Hence there is no < ITRM -minimal ITRM-c-random real y.
Furthermore, we have ω
, then, by the relativized version of Lemma 19 (see the remark following the Lemma), x is ITRM-c-random relative to y. By Theorem 22, z := x ⊕ y is ITRM-c-random, and we clearly have y < ITRM z, so y is not maximal.
In the Turing degrees, it is a striking experience that intermediate degrees (i.e. degrees lying properly between two iterations of the Turing jump) don't seem to come up 'naturally', but need to be constructed on purpose (see e.g. the discussion in [18] ). Concerning ITRMs, we can to a certain extent prove that something similar is going on: Namely, reals of intermediate degree are never recognizable.
Proof. Let P be a program recognizing x. Then, by Theorem 5, P x stops in less than ω CK,x ω many steps. Consequently, the computation is contained in
is a limit of admissible ordinals. By a theorem of Jensen and Karp ( [11] ), Σ 1 -formulas are absolute between L α and V α whenever α is a limit of admissibles. Hence L ω CK,x ω |= ∃yP y ↓= 1. By absoluteness of computations then, we have x ∈ L ω CK,x ω , as desired.
Proof. This is a relativized version of Theorem 26 of [2] . We sketch the proof for completeness: By assumption, let P be an ITRM-program that recognizes x.
It then follows that ω
The idea is to first use x ′ ITRM to decide for any program P i whether P x i computes a real coding a well-ordering; moreover, these codes can be read out explictly with the help of x ′ . To see this, let P i be given. It is easy to compute from i the index f (i) for an ITRM-program P f (i) such that P x f (i) halts if and only if P x i halts with output 0 or 1, i.e. computes a real number. Given that P x i computes a real number, as ITRMs can check relations for well-foundedness (see [9] ), it is also easy to effectively obtain from i an ITRM-program index g(i) such that P x g(i) halts if and only if the real computed by P x i codes a well-founded relation. Furthermore, given that P x i computes a real number, it is also easy to effectively obtain from i an ITRM-program index h(i) such that for every j ∈ ω, P x h(i) (j) halts if and only if the jth bit of the real number computed by P x i is 1. Hence, using x ′ , we can compute the jth bit of the ith code of a well-ordering ITRM-computable in the oracle x.
Finally, we can now assemble all of these codes into a code for a wellordering of order type their sum, which will be the supremum of the ordinals with codes ITRM-computable in the oracle x, i.e. ω CK,x ω . Thus, from x ′ , we can compute a code for a well-ordering of order-type ω
is the supremum of the ordinals with codes ITRM-computable in the oracle x ′ , it follows that ω
; hence there is some minimal k ∈ ω such that ω halts hence reduces to checking a first-order statement in the structure coded by c, which can be done as described in the last section of [10] . x ′ can now be identified by checking whether the statement 'P x i ↓' holds in the structure coded by c for each i ∈ ω and comparing the results to the oracle. This leads to the following procedure for recognizing x ⊕ x ′ : Suppose that y = y 1 ⊕ y 2 is given in the oracle. First, we run P on y 1 to check whether y 1 = x. If not, then y = x ⊕ x ′ . Otherwise, check, using a halting problem solver for Q, whether Q y 2 computes a real r coding L ω
Proof. Note that x is Turing-computable from x ′ ITRM : To determine the ith bit of x when x ′ ITRM is given, simply use x ′ ITRM to check whether the ITRMprogram Q i that stops when the ith bit of its oracle is 1 and otherwise enters an infinite loop halts in the oracle x. This works uniformly in x. Let Q be an ITRM-program that computes x from x ′ ITRM , for every x ⊆ ω.
To recognize x ′ ITRM , we proceed as follows: First, let P be a program that recognizes x. Now, given y in the oracle, first check, using a halting problem solver for Q, whether Q y computes a real number. If not, then y = x ′ . Otherwise, let z be that number and run
It is easy to see that 0
Hence, by Lemma 34, 0
for all i ∈ ω; hence (σ i |i ∈ ω) is a strictly increasing sequence of limits of admissible ordinals.
We now proceed inductively to show that
; as σ 1 is a limit of admissibles, we have
We can now extend Theorem 31 to obtain intermediate degrees also for iterations of the jump operator:
Corollary 37. There is a real x such that 0
(and hence ITRMc-random). (Such a real exists because, at ω CK ω2 + 1, the ultimate projectum drops to ω, so that already L ω CK ω2 +2 contains a real Cohen-generic over L ω CK ω2 ; this real is certainly Cohen-generic over L ω CK ω and hence ITRM-c-random by Theorem 19, and cannot be an element of
by Lemma 34 and Corollary 35, hence
by Theorem 36. Consequently, we have x ≤ 0
In particular, there is a real coding a well-ordering of order type ω
By a similar argument, one gets intermediate degrees between any two successive (finite) iterations of the ITRM-jump:
Corollary 38. For every i ∈ ω, there is a real x i such that 0
Given Corollary 38, one may ask whether any of these intermediate degrees is in some natural sense 'unique'. As above (see the passage preceeding Definition 15), a way to capture the meaning of 'unique' that suggests itself in the context of ITRMs is ITRM-recognizability. It turns out that, in this interpretation, no intermediate degree in the finite iterations of the ITRM-jump is 'unique':
ITRM for some i ∈ ω and that x ∈ RECOG. Then there is j ∈ ω such that x ∈ [0
by Theorem 36. As x is recognizable, we have x ∈ L ω CK,x ω by Theorem 33. Hence ω CK,x ω is a limit of admissibles strictly bigger than ω
, we have 0
, and hence 0
ITRM ≤ x. Now assume for a contradiction that x is as in the assumption of the theorem, but not ITRM-computably equivalent to some 0
ITRM for some i ∈ ω, there is some j ∈ ω such that x > ITRM 0 (j) ; without loss of generality, let j be minimal with this property. Then j > 0 and x > ITRM 0
ITRM , so j is as desired. We can, however, also find reals x with degree strictly between 0 and 0 ′ ITRM that are not random. This will, after some preparation, be shown in Theorem 44 below.
Definition 40. For x, y ⊆ ω, we write x ≤ n ITRM y to indicate that x is computable from y by an ITRM-program using at most n registers.
Lemma 41. There is a natural number C such that, for all reals x, y with x ≤ n ITRM y, we have ω
Proof. It is not hard to see that there is a constant c such that, for every 0 < k ∈ ω and every real z, a real coding ω CK,z k is (uniformly) ITRMcomputable from z by a program P using at most kc many registers. Now, if x ≤ n ITRM y via a program Q using at most n registers, we can, given y in the oracle, first use Q to compute x and then P to compute a code for ω CK,x k . Hence, for some constant d (which is independent from k, x, y, n), we can compute a code for ω CK,x k in the oracle y using at most kc + n + d many registers. With C = c + d, we hence get that such a code is computable from y with at most kC + n many registers. However, every such real will be an element of L ω CK,y kC+n+1 Theorem 43. Let (α ι |ι < δ) be a countable sequence of admissible ordinals greater than ω such that, for each ν < δ, α ν is admissible relative to (α ι |ι < ν). Then there is a real x such that α ι is the ιth x-admissible ordinal greater than ω. With α = sup{α ι |ι < δ}, such a real is arithmetically constructible from any real coding (L α+1 ({α ι |ι < δ}), ∈, {α ι |ι < δ}). If α is an index and (α ι |ι < δ) is definable over L α , then such a real is contained in L α+2 .
Theorem 44. There is a real 0 < ITRM x < ITRM 0 ′ ITRM such that x is not ITRM-c-random; in fact, x can be chosen in such a way that x is not ITRMreducible to any ITRM-c-random real y. would be computable from x. Now assume that x is reducible to an ITRM-c-random real y via a program P using n registers. By Corollary 10, we have ω
for all i ∈ ω. By Lemma 41, there is 1 < C ∈ ω such that ω CK,x i ≤ ω
CK,y
Ci+n+1 for all i ∈ ω. Consequently, we have ω
Ci+n+1 for all i ∈ ω, which implies i 2 ≤ Ci+n+1 for all i ∈ ω, which is obviously false (e.g. for i ≥ C + n + 1). So x is not reducible to an ITRM-c-random real.
Corollary 45. There are 0 < ITRM x, y < 0 ′ ITRM such that x ⊥ ITRM y and neither x nor y is ITRM-c-random.
Proof. Let (a n |n ∈ ω) and (b n |n ∈ ω) be two strictly increasing sequences of natural numbers such that, for every C ∈ ω, there are k, l ∈ ω with a k > b Ck and b l > a Cl . For example, we may take a 1 = b 1 = 1, and then recursively 
Ck+n+1 ; consequently, we have (C + n + 1)k < Ck + n + 1, which is impossible for k > 0.
Remark: The same strategy allows the construction of arbitrarily long finite and in fact a countable set of pairwise incomparable, reals < ITRM 0 ′ ITRM which are neither ITRM-c-random nor even ITRM-reducible to a ITRM-c-random real.
Autoreducibility for Infinite Time Register Machines
Intuitively, a real x is called autoreducible if each of its bits can be effectively recovered from its position in x and all other bits of x. A discussion of the classical notion of autoreducibility can, for example, be found in [6] . We want to consider how this concept behaves in the context of infinitary machine models of computation. For the time being, we focus on ITRMs -but the notion of course makes sense for other types like the Infinite Time Turing Machines (ITTMs, see [7] ), Ordinal Turing machines and Ordinal Register Machines (OTMs and ORMs, see e.g. [15] ) etc. as well.
Definition 46. For x ∈ ω 2, we define x \n as x with its nth bit deleted (i.e. the bits up to n are the same, all further bits are shifted one place to the left). We say that x is ITRM-autoreducible if and only if there is an ITRMprogram P such that P x \n (n) ↓= x(n) for all n ∈ ω. x is called totally incompressible if and only if it is not ITRM-autoreducible, i.e. there is no ITRM-program P such that P x \n (n) ↓= x(n) for all n ∈ ω. If there is such a program, then we say that P autoreduces x, P is an autoreduction for x or that x is autoreducible via P . Proof. Clearly, if P computes x, then P is also an autoreduction for x. If x is recognizable and P recognizes x, we can easily retrieve a deleted bit by plugging in 0 and 1 and letting P run on both results to see for which one P stops with output 1. (The same idea works for finite subsets instead of single bits.) For 0 ′ ITRM , if a program index j is given, it is easy to determine some index i = j corresponding to a program that works in exactly the same way (by e.g. adding a meaningless line somewhere), so that the remaining bits allow us to reconstruct the jth bit.
Remark: The autoreducibility of 0 ′ ITRM also follows from the first part of the corollary and the recognizability of 0 ′ ITRM (see [2] ).
Definition 48. Let x ∈ ω 2, i ∈ ω. Then flip(x, i) denotes the real obtained from x by just changing the ith bit, i.e. x∆{i}.
In the classical setting, no random real is autoreducible. This is still true for ITRM-and ITRM-c-randomness:
Theorem 49. If x is ITRM-random or ITRM-c-random, then x is totally incompressible.
Proof. Assume that x is autoreducible via P . We show that x is not ITRMrandom. Let X be the set of all y which are autoreducible via P . Obviously, we have x ∈ X. X is certainly decidable: Given y, use a halting problem solver for P to see whether P y \n (n) ↓ for all n ∈ ω. If not, then y / ∈ X. Otherwise, carry out these ω many computations and check the results one after the other.
Since X is ITRM-decidable, it is provably ∆ 1 2 , which implies that X is measurable.
We show that X must be of measure 0. To see this, assume for a contradiction that µ(X) > 0. Note first, that, whenever y is P -autoreducible and z is a real that deviates from y in exactly one digit (say, the ith bit), then z is not P -autoreducible (since P will compute the ith bit wrongly).
By the Lebesgue density theorem, there is an open basic interval I (i.e. consisting of all reals that start with a certain finite binary string s length k ∈ ω) such that the relative measure of X in I is > 
(where µ I denotes the relative measure for I). So X ′ andX ′ are two disjoint subsets of I both with relative measure > 1 2
, a contradiction.
For the analogous statement for ITRM-c-randomness, we proceed similarly, taking I to be an interval in which X ∩ I is comeager instead. That such an I exists can be seen as follows: Suppose that X is not meager. As above, X is ITRM-decidable, hence provably ∆ 1 2 and therefore has the Baire property. Then, there is an open set U such that (X \ U) ∪ (U \ X) is meager. In particular, U is not empty. Hence X is comeager in U. As U is open, there is a nonempty open interval I ⊆ U. It is now obvious that X ∩ I is comeager in I, so I is as desired. We then use the same argument as above, noting that two comeager subsets of I cannot be disjoint.
Corollary 50. Let x be Cohen-generic over L ω CK ω . Then x is totally incompressible.
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 49 and Corollary 19.
Remark: When we demand that every finite subset of the bits of x (instead of every single bit) can be effectively obtained from the remaining bits and the positions of the missing bits by some ITRM-program, we get the notion of strong autoreducibility. Strong autoreducibility is a strictly stronger notion than autoreducibility: If x is Cohen-generic over L ω CK ω , then y := x ⊕ x is clearly autoreducible; however, by Corollary 50, y is not strongly autoreducible, as a procedure for obtaining even just the 2nth and 2n + 1th bit of y from the remaining bits for every n would lead to an autoreduction for x.
Definition 51. Denote by IC ITRM and RA ITRM the set of totally incompressible and ITRM-random reals, respectively.
Corollary 52. The set of ITRM-autoreducible reals has measure 0 and is meager.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 49 shows that, for any ITRM-program P , the set of reals autoreducible via P has measure 0. As there are only countable many programs, the result follows. Meagerness follows from Corollary 50.
By Theorem 49, we have RA ITRM ⊆IC ITRM . By now, we have observed various similarities between totally incompressibility and randomness. However, the converse of Theorem 49 fails for ITRM-randomness:
Proposition 53. IC ITRM ⊆ RA ITRM , i.e. there is a real x such that x is totally incompressible, but not ITRM-random.
Proof. Let y be ITRM-c-random and let x = y ⊕ 0. Then x is not ITRM-crandom since [0, 1] ⊕ 0 is ITRM-decidable and meager. Moreover, x is totally incompressible: For an autoreduction P for x would immediately lead to an autoreduction for y: To determine the nth bit of y given y \n , we only need to run P (y⊕0) \2n , where (y ⊕ 0) \2n is just y \n ⊕ 0 with an extra 0 inserted at the 2nth place. However, by Theorem 49, y is totally incompressible.
Conclusion and further work
The most pressing issue is certainly to strengthen the parallelism between ITRM-randomness and ML-randomness by studying the corresponding notion for sets of Lebesgue measure 0 rather than meager sets. Moreover, in focusing on decidable sets as the relevant tests for ITRM-c-randomness, we deviate from the spirit of ML-randomness. An ITRM-based notion closer to the idea of ML-randomness would be 'ITRM-ML-randomness': A set X is an ITRM-ML-test if and only if there is an ITRM-program P such that (1) P (i) computes (in an appropriate coding) a set U i of rational intervals with µ( U i ) ≤ 2 −i for all i ∈ ω and (2) X = i∈ω U i . A real x is then called ITRM-ML-random if it is not an element of any ITRM-ML-test. Note that, by solvability of the bounded halting problem for ITRMs, every ITRM-MLtest is ITRM-decidable, so that ITRM-ML-randomness is a weaker notion than ITRM-randomness. We presently do not know, however, whether it is strictly weaker.
Still, ITRM-c-randomness shows an interesting behaviour, partly analogous to ML-randomness, though by quite different arguments. Similar approaches are likely to work for other machine models of generalized computations, in particular ITTMs ( [7] ) (which were shown in [3] to obey the analogue of the non-meager part of Theorem 9) and ordinal Turing Machines ( [14] ) (for which the analogues of both parts of Theorem 9 turned out to be independent of ZFC) which we study in ongoing work. This further points towards a more general background theory of computation that allow unified arguments for all these various models as well as classical computability. Furthermore, we want to see whether the remarkable conceptual stability of ML-randomness (for example the equivalence with Chaitin randomness or unpredictabiliy in the sense of r.e. Martingales, see e.g. sections 6.1 and 6.3 of [6] ) carries over to the new context.
